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INTRODUCING: A BIANNUAL SURVEY OF
NEW YORK PRACTICE
DAVID D. SIEGEL t
NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
With this edition, St. John's Law Review inaugurates a special
survey of CPLR material designed to keep practitioners abreast
of the development of the new New York law of procedure. The
survey will entail a treatment in each edition of the Law Review
of recent developments, not only under the CPLR, but under such
other provisions of New York law as concern procedure. For
example, the New York City Civil and Uniform District Court
Acts 1 and the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
became effective concurrently with the CPLR (on September 1,
1963). As the cases appear on the CPLR, the Civil or District
Court Acts, the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law,
and other procedural provisions of the Consolidated Laws the Law
Review will keep abreast of them and, in each edition, set forth
the more important cases in an integrated treatment of what is
happening in the courts under the new law of procedure. By
this means, the Law Review hopes to advise bench and bar alike
of the growth and development of the new procedural law of the
state as it is construed and applied. The treatment will differ
from a text in that it will cover only the period preceding the
respective edition of the Law Review. Cumulatively, it is con-
templated that a continuing perspective of the new practice will
be achieved.
For this edition, covering the first few months of the CPLR's
life, only a few areas can be treated; there are few areas indeed
in which case law has even begun to develop. The decisions so
far have been primarily from special term-motion parts-and
the motion calendars are heavy enough to preclude the kind of
' Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law;
Member of the New York Bar. Assistant Counsel, Joint Legislative Com-
mittee on Court Reorganization; Draftsman, New York City Civil Court
Act, Uniform District Court Act and Uniform City Court Act.
1 For the purposes of this survey the New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules will be referred to and cited as CPLR, the Civil Practice Act
as CPA, the Rules of Civil Practice as RCP. The New York City Civil
Court Act will be cited as CCA, and the Uniform District Court Act as
UDCA.
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background investigation that the construction of a new act requires.
The problem is understandable, and indicates that it may be
some time before one can point to a substantial body of case
law under the CPLR. While the New York Law Journal has
published literally hundreds of decisions citing CPLR provisions,
few of them offer the kind of treatment that would make the
case a valuable part of the anticipated case law.2
There is doubtless a hesitancy on the part of judges to go
deeply into something that they do not yet fully understand.
A number of courses have been offered on the CPLR by the
State Bar Association, the Practising Law Institute, local bar
associations, state and city trial lawyers' associations, and law
schools, but these have been designed primarily to give back-
ground and highlights. An intimate knowledge of even one CPLR
provision may not be sufficient to enable a judge to construe and
apply it in a case where both sides can offer support for con-
flicting constructions. It will often depend on whether a given
provision can perform its job independently, or whether its real
meaning becomes clear only when read alongside other provisions.
That is, the individual provision may by itself indicate a particular
result on a point raised, but in the light of other provisions it
might appear to warrant a different construction. The material
on pleadings under the CPLR which makes up the second part
of this article can illustrate this. Rule 3014 of the CPLR requires
separate statement and numbering of allegations. If a pleading
should appear which violates this requirement, an attorney might
quickly conclude that he can make a motion to compel the
separate numbering. Rule 3014 by itself could reasonably be so
interpreted. But that provision is part of a new approach to
pleadings that the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure
devised; and actually, the movant who wants to compel his
adversary to separately state and number does not earn a grant
of his motion merely by showing that the pleading is not properly
paragraphed and numbered. He must show that he is prejudiced
by the pleader's failure to follow rule 3014. That requirement
comes from section 3026, and must be applied upon any corrective
motion under Article. 30 of the CPLR.
A further illustration. Section 308(3) of the CPLR is not
clear as to whether the "residence" it refers to means a residence
in the state or a residence outside the state. In a given case,
however, the matter may be academic, because it may be a case
2There have been some important decisions, however, of which the
most significant is a case decided by Justice Pittoni, Steele v. De Leeuw(Sup. Ct., Nassau County Nov. 6, 1963), 150 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1963, p. 17,
col. 4. It will be discussed in detail later in this article, under the section
entitled: The Longarin Statute: Section 302, infra at 195.
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in which service outside the state is permitted anyway. Whether
such outside service is permissible is governed by section 313.
If it appears in a given case that section 313 is applicable, and
extraterritorial service therefore available, the case is not a
proper one for an independent construction of section 308(3).
If the case falls under section 313, "residence" in section 308(3)
can be a residence outside the state for that very reason.3
Hence, the question of whether the "residence" of section 308(3)
means an out-of-state residence in 'an instance where section 313
is not applicable would not be properly before the court. The
tie in between sections 308 and 313 might further involve sections
301 or 302.
Problems of this nature pervade the CPLR. It may be difficult
to apply a provision by its own terms independently of others;
the difficulty is compounded when the provision is one of a set
of provisions embodying, in the aggregate, an approach or a
system applicable to a given procedural area. In many cases, it
will only be after the bench and bar have developed some degree
of familiarity with the entire CPLR that meaningful construction
can begin to appear for individual provisions. That takes time.
With that background, I would like to highlight some of the
cases available so far on matters of interest to the bar.
The Transition Provision: Section 10003
Perhaps most important to practitioners at the moment is the
extent to which the CPLR will apply in pending cases, i.e., in cases
commenced prior to September 1, 1963. That entire problem was
sought to be solved in just eight lines by Section 10003 of the
CPLR, which reads:
This act shall apply to all actions hereafter commenced. This act shall also
apply to all further proceedings in pending actions, except to the extent
that the court determines that application in a particular pending action
would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former
procedure applies. Proceedings pursuant to law in an action taken prior
to the time this action takes effect shall not be rendered ineffectual or im-
paired by this act.
That is all there is on the subject.4  The revisers did not
attempt to spell out in detail the extent to which CPLR provisions
3 Since § 313 .directs that service outside the state shall, when permitted,
be made in the same manner as service is made within the state, § 308(which provides for the methods of service within the state) must be
looked to for out-of-state service methods to implement § 313.
4 Except for the statute of limitations, which, has a special transition
provision: § 218. The latter is designed to protect plaintiffs by giving them,
for any cause of action accrued prior to September 1, 1963, the benefit of
either the CPA period or the CPLR period, whichever is longer.
[ VoL. 38
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would govern pending actions. Such an endeavor would have
resulted in a transition statute perhaps as big as the CPLR itself.
They took the wisest step, and left it entirely with the courts to
decide to what extent prior law could be used in pending cases.
That is the approach of the federal rules.;
One thing is clear immediately. If the action was commenced
after September 1, 1963, the CPA and RCP are out of the picture.
The court's discretion under section 10003, to permit resort
to prior law, is applicable only to cases begun before September
1. But with calendars the way they are, section 10003 will have
importance for a long time; it will not lose its vitality until the last
"pending" case has been disposed of, and that may take years.
The following illustrations from cases decided after September
1, involving section 10003 either expressly or impliedly, may serve
to assist the practitioner in determining how to proceed on a
point involving transition.
Perryman Burns Coal Co. v. Mandelbaum6 is an excellent
case on section 10003. A summary judgment motion had been
made prior to September 1, 1963. Procedure thereon did not,
under prior law, contemplate that an order denying the motion,
or granting it in part, would list facts found by the judge to be
uncontroverted. But the new provision, Rule 32 12 (g) of the
CPLR, specifically empowers the court to state such uncontroverted
facts in the order (which facts are then deemed established and
need not be proved at the trial).
Though the summary judgment motion had been made and
decided prior to September 1, the order was not submitted until
after that date. The order submitted was in accordance with the
new rule 3212(g), listing facts which the judge found un-
controverted on the motion made prior to September 1. The
question was whether an order submitted after September 1, on
a motion made prior thereto, could follow the new practice. The
The bar should also take note of a case decided by Justice Feiden,
Ernst v. Ernst (Sup. Ct, Kings County Nov. 8, 1963), 150 N.Y.L.J., Nov.
8, 1963, p. 14, col. 5. It holds that those provisions of the CPA which
went, not into the CPLR, but into other of the Consolidated Laws, are
also to be governed by § 10003 of the CPLR. That is, to the extent such
provisions have been in any way altered on matters of procedure, the
changes should apply to causes of action accrued and even to actions com-
menced, prior to September 1, 1963. The specific provisions under discussion
in Ernst were those that went from the CPA into the Domestic Relations
Law. But the case would be authority for the application of § 10003 to
CPA provisions going into any of the Consolidated Laws. Numerous of
those provisions are now found, for example, in the new Real Property
Actions and Proceedings Law.
5 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doe. No. 20, FouRtH PRELI, xNARy REPORT OF THE
ADvIsoRy Commirmrra ox P CECE AND PROCEDRa 155.6243 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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order submitted sought to exploit the new practice. The court
accepted the order, holding that section 10003 was intended to
make such procedure possible.
Of greater importance to practitioners will be the possibility
of adverse consequences that may result because, in a pending case,
the lawyer may not know to what extent he may rely on prior
law as against the new law. A problem of that nature arose in
the area of appearance. The CPLR has made a number of chaniges
regarding appearance, which cannot be gone into here, but the
long and short of it is that Section 237-a of the CPA and its
approach to appearance is out, and the new provisions on the
subject, section 320 and rule 3211(a) (8) and (e) are somewhat
involved. The methods of appearing, and of making and pre-
serving a jurisdictional objection are much changed by the CPLR.
Even a practitioner familiar with the old and the new law may
not be able to determine which he will be bound by in a case, e.g.,
in which steps had been taken under prior law upon the assumption,
reasonable at the time, that all further steps would follow prior
law. If a jurisdictional objection had been raised under prior law,
and follow-up steps taken in reliance upon it, what would happen
to the jurisdictional objection if the matter is now to be governed
by the new law, which has an entirely different set of solutions?
A case involving such a problem is Rothstein v. Autourist A/S.7
The defendant was confronted with this dilemma, and on a motion
to resettle a prior order he asked the court to clarify the law
by which he would be deemed bound. The court solved his
problem readily. It told him that he may rely on prior law for
all matters relative to appearance, and directed that the order
should so provide. The dilemma was solved in one stroke by a
wise exercise of the discretion lodged in the court by section
10003.
There have been other decisions on section 10003, but the
above will illustrate what the provision can mean to the practitioner."
Some cases have taken a stricter view of section 10003 than the
Perryman case adopted, holding that merely because a motion
was made before September 1 it must in all respects be governed
by prior law.9  That view would appear too severe. Section
10003 is designed to give the court wide discretion on a case-by-
case basis, and the court should not feel bound to prior law in
7 (Sup. Ct., New York County Sept. 17, 1963), 150 N.Y.L.J., Sept.
17, 1963, p. 11, col. 6 (Silverman, J.).
8 Steele v. De Leeuw, supra note 1, treats of whether CPLR § 302 is
retroactive.
9 See, e.g., Sabin v. Raymond (Sup. Ct., Nassau County Oct. 8, 1963),
150 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 8, 1963, p. 17, col. 2; Berman v. Booth Memorial House
(Sup. Ct., Queens County Oct. 7, 1963), 150 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1963, p. 18,
cot. 1 (Herz, J.).
[ VOL. 38
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an instance where a new procedure may be applied without
difficulty and without prejudice to any party. Perryman points
up vividly the advantage of the leeway that section 10003 allows
to the court.
The Longarm Statute: Section 302
Probably the most important contribution of the CPLR is
section 302, a "longarm" statute that seeks to subject non-
domiciliaries to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, even
if the summons cannot be personally delivered to the non-
domiciliary defendant within the state. It is activated by the
defendant's transaction of business, commission of a tort, or owner-
ship, use or possession of real property within New York;
if the cause of action arises out of any of those in-New-York
activities, the defendant may be served anywhere.10
The section has raised a number of questions, including
whether it is applicable to corporations and whether it is retro-
active. The bar has also been wondering what acts of a defendant
would constitute a transaction of business sufficient to invoke
section 302(a)(1). In what is probably the first major case
under the CPLR, Supreme Court Justice Mario Pittoni has
answered the first two questions outright and provided at least
one answer to the third. The case is Steele v. De Leeuw; -it
appears in the New York Law Journal of November 6, 1963.1
Beleco was a foreign corporation not licensed to do business
in New York. In its behalf, De Leeuw "executed a contract
in the State of New York for the purpose, inter alia, of acquiring
certain shares of stock. . . ." The corporation received the
stock pursuant to the contract and "as such recipient became
obligated under certain terms of the contract. . . ." The action
brought against the foreign corporation was "based upon the
contract."
As to whether section 302 is retroactive: Justice Pittoni
held that it is. He held that the statute applies "even though
the cause of action accrued and the action commenced prior to the
effective date [September 1, 1963] of the statute."
Though section 10003 was not cited, it was necessarily in-
volved. It is that section which mandates the retroactivity of the
CPLR. The Steele case is authority for the application of section
302 not only when the cause of action has accrued prior to
10 Section 313 of the CPLR permits extraterritorial service where, inter
alia, the case is one within § 302.
1L Supra note 2. The case will probably be officially reported, and prac-
titioners should watch for it in the advance sheets.
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September 1, but when the action has been commenced prior to
that date.' 2
As to whether section 302 is applicable to corporations:
Justice Pittoni held that it is. The question had been troubling
the bar because of the section's use of masculine pronouns and
its reference to an executor and administrator. The Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure intended section 302 to
apply to corporations.13  The Civil and District Court Acts assume
it is applicable to corporations.1 4 Nonetheless, the question had
not been answered by the courts. Justice Pittoni's answer was
quite casual, but clear: "In so far as a non-domiciliary is
concerned, and that includes a foreign corporation not licensed to
do business in this state, it is clear that. . ...
Finally, the Steele case suggests a very liberal interpretation
of section 302 (a) (1), as to the acts that will constitute the trans-
action of business thereunder. The contacts that the corporation
had with New York were stated by Justice Pittoni to be "the
signing of this contract in New York, by Bernard De Leeuw
on behalf of N. V. Beleco [the corporation], and the transfer of
the stock, pursuant to the terms of the contract, to N. V. Baleco
[sic]. . . ." The above, it was held, "were sufficient contacts
within this state to constitute a transaction of business within the
state, and finally that this action is based upon the contract herein-
above mentioned."
Thus, the making of a single contract in New York with a
transfer of stock pursuant to it has been held sufficient contacts
to invoke section 302(a) (1). The quantity of business that the
defendant corporation contemplated in New York was not the
subject of investigation. One contract plus the stock transfer
activated the section.' 5 This suggests that a different and more
liberal yardstick may be used for defendants under the trans-
action of business requirement of section 302 (a) (1) than will
be used under the commission of a tort predicate of section 302(a) (2). As to the latter, cases construing analogous statutes
have not contented themselves merely with the fact of an injury
occurring within the state as the result of allegedly tortious conduct.
12 On the. general subject of the retroactivity of § 302, see 1 WEINSTEIN,
KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRK CivJ. PRACTICE 302.04, at 3-35 (1963). See
also 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13, SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 478.
13 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, op. cit. spra note 12, ff 302.05, at 3-37.
14See CCA §404(d); UDCA §404(d). The section (in each of the
two acts) is modeled on CPLR § 302. See N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW, COURT
AcTs § 404, commentary on revision (McKinney's 1963).
15 There is precedent for basing an extraterritorial exercise of statejurisdiction on a single contract made within the state. See, e.g., CompaniaDe Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
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Investigation was carried further. In the case of Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., the court found by inference
that the non-domiciliary defendant contemplated extensive sales
of his product in the state.Y6 In the case of Deveny v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., the court assured itself that the defendant could reason-
ably have contemplated consequences in the state.17 In each, the
investigation appeared to be the result of the court's doubt as
to whether the fulfillment of the simple statutory criterion (injury
within the state) would suffice under the due process clause.18
Steele was a commercial case, falling under section 302 (a) (1),
treating the transaction of business; the cited Illinois and Second
Circuit cases involved analogues of section 302(a)(2), treating
the commission of a tort. It is obvious that, insofar as the
contacts doctrine is concerned, there is a difference between the
transaction of business and the commission of a tort. The former
is an intentional act; the latter is (at least in negligence cases)
accidental. It is likely that more liberality will be shown in
subjecting a non-domiciliary to our jurisdiction based upon an
intentional business transaction within the state than based upon
an unintentional injury inflicted within the state, especially when
the negligent act or omission occurred outside the state. It is in
the latter situation that the court will be more prone to seek out
other factors to assure itself that due process of law is being
accorded the defendant, and in that light we can understand why
the Gray and Deveny cases seemed to look for more than the
statute, by its terms, required.
Apparent Misconstructions
At least two cases which have been officially reported appear,
to this writer in any event, to make erroneous interpretations of
CPLR provisions.
One such case is Jensen v. Jensen.'9 It was a special pro-
ceeding, which had been brought without specific statutory authority
for it. Section 103(b) of the CPLR states that "all civil judicial
18Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 II1. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
17 Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963), involving
the Vermont "longarm" statute.
's See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), to
which all general "longarm" statutes must trace their constitutionality. And
note the subsequent cases of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957), which appeared to expand the states' powers, considerably, and
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), which reminded the bar that
there are still limitations on the territorial jurisdiction of state courts.
See also 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, op. cit. supra note 12, 302.03, at
3-32.
19243 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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proceedings shall be prosecuted in the form of an action, except
where prosecution in the form of a special proceeding is authorized."
Section 103(c) provides, however, that if a special proceeding
is commenced when unauthorized, it "shall not be dismissed
solely because it is not brought in the proper form. . . ." In
the cited case, the special proceeding appears to have been dis-
missed only because it was not brought in the proper form (i.e.,
as an action).
The court was apparently apprehensive about the petitioner's
effort to (as the court said) "obtain a preference" by bringing
a special proceeding rather than an action. But that could have
been avoided without a dismissal. The court could merely have
directed the petitioner to serve a complaint on the respondent,
giving the latter twenty days to answer, and further directing
that the litigation thereafter proceed as if a plenary action.
That was apparently the kind of result contemplated by the re-
visers when they drafted Section 103 of the CPLR.20
Another case is 180 Tenants Corp. v. Ungar.21 The erroneous
assumption that appears to have been made in that case is that
the procedure of notice may be used to take depositions in a
summary proceeding to recover possession of real property. Such
a proceeding is a special proceeding, 22 and disclosure (including
depositions) is available in special proceedings only by court
order.23  But the denial of the motion to vacate the notice was
the equivalent of an order directing the disclosure to take place,
which seems a fair result in any event.
In future editions of the Law Review, it will-one may
contemplate-be possible to treat extensively the case law de-
veloping on the CPLR. In this edition because of the paucity
of cases that decide important issues in the short time that the
CPLR has been in effect, a general study of pleadings under
the CPLR will be offered.
A PERSPECTIVE ON PLEADING UNDER THE CPLR:
THE "MOTION YARDSTICK"
One of the most important areas of any practice code is its
pleadings article, and with the advent of the CPLR it is urgent
that both bench and bar understand the CPLR's approach to
20 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 17, THIRD PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COlMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDuRE 47.
21245 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Civ. Ct. 1963).
22 See REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW § 701.
23 CPLR § 408.
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pleadings. This area of practice was the subject of much study
and reflection by the Advisory Committee on Practice and Pro-
cedure, and the provisions drafted to cover it in article 30 import
not merely a few new rules but, in effect, an entirely new
approach. This article endeavors to set forth this new approach
by use of what-for lack of a better term-I have called the
"motion yardstick ;" it consists of testing the adequacy of a pleading
by the motions that the CPLR might make available against it.
The "yardsticks" will be treated after a few preliminary matters
are discussed.
If the new CPLR approach to pleadings is not understood
and implemented during the early stages of the CPLR's life, it
can be easily obscured. The slate is not wiped clean of prior
provisions affecting pleadings: several CPA provisions have found
their way into the CPLR, some with very little change even in
form. But a number of new provisions appear, and the aggregate
of these additions, when considered in light of the purposes that
the Advisory Committee labored to effectuate, spell out the new
approach. Pleading can be a good deal easier under the CPLR
than it was under the CPA. Whether it will improve as much
as the Advisory Committee intended depends entirely on whether
the courts understand and execute the Committee's intent. The
CPLR has all of the tools for carrying this out; it is merely
a question of how they will be used. How they will be used
by the courts depends, in turn, on how well the bar familiarizes
itself with their intended use and stays with the new approach
until it forms a well-understood and permanent part of our practice.
If this is not done at the outset, the CPLR's pleadings provisions
can become the implements for treating pleadings exactly as they
were treated under prior law. That would constitute a reversion
to some absurd pleading rules, and to a procession of corrective
motions that have no purpose to serve for anyone except the lawyer
bent on delay or harassment.
The purpose of this part of my article is to outline this new
approach to pleadings in as simple a form as possible-to provide
a perspective of what the CPLR wants of a pleading. Its scope
cannot possibly cover the detail that the subject warrants. For
this detail, I would refer the reader to volume 3 of New York
Civil Practice, by Professors Weinstein, Korn and Miller, which
sets forth an extensive study of pleadings under the CPLR, in-
cluding comparisons with prior law and with the federal rules,
integration of case law, and historical background. This article
will refer to specific portions of that work from time to time.
Attention, furthermore, will herein be directed to affirmative
19631]
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pleading, i.e., the pleading of a cause of action, rather than to
denials and defenses.
2 4
The fundamental pleading requirement of the CPLR is section
3013, which provides that:
Statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court
and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions
or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause
of action or defense.
It is thus established at the outset that CPLR pleadings will
have the primary function that pleadings have always had-that
of advising one's adversary of the pleader's complaint.
Rule 3014 then repeats the CPA requirement of separate
numbering, and this separate numbering requirement applies to
"statements" as well as to "separate causes of action or defenses."
Good pleading always dictates that no more than-one allegation
appear in a single paragraph. The CPLR, "as far as practicable,"
imposes this obligaton on a pleader. To what extent, if any,
may a motion be made against a pleading that does not follow
this separate numbering requirement? We shall see.
The CPLR has a number of good things that come in very
small packages. One of its best statements comes in its smallest
package-section 3026. That section consists of but two lines,
and lays the foundation on which must rest-if the bench and
bar will let it come to rest-the CPLR's fresh attitude about
pleadings. After providing that pleadings shall be liberally con-
strued-which the CPA25 dictated, also, with apparently little
avail-it goes on to declare that: "Defects shall be ignored if a
substantial right of a party is not prejudiced."
If the court should find any tendency on the part of an
attorney to use any technical pleading requirement of the CPLR
as a weapon to delay or oppress rather than as a tool to protect
a legitimate interest of his client, the court can restrain him
with no more than a citation to Section 3026 of the CPLR. The
question will not only be: Did the pleader fail to follow a
requirement of pleading? It will be that question plus: Is the
movant prejudiced by the failure? Both questions must be put,
and an affirmative answer to both must appear before the movant
can prevail.
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff has included two or
three allegations in a single paragraph. He has quite clearly
24 It is the author's hope that the reader, at several junctures in the
course of this article, will notice how repetitive it becomes. This will be
particularly true when the CPLR "motion yardstick" is being applied to
determine what has happened to the myriad pleading technicalities that sup-
ported corrective motions under prior law.
25 See CPA § 275.
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violated the one-allegation-per-paragraph edict of rule 3014. The
violation may have been entirely unnecessary, i.e., one that could
readily have been avoided by the separate numbering of three
readily separable allegations. The CPLR's attitude at this juncture
is (and the judge's attitude should be): so what? Show me
how you're prejudiced. Are you unable to understand the
allegations? Can't you answer the paragraph? Is there anything
there you want to admit? If you want to admit something, why
don't you just state in your answer what you want to admit
and deny all the rest?
If, indeed, the allegations are such that the movant cannot
understand them, or cannot answer them, he should have relief;
and in such case the CPLR does not withhold relief. But if
the movant is playing games with the pleading, happily con-
templating a slight delay, a bit of harassment, a dash or so of
pressure to make the pleader settle for less than he is entitled to,
the CPLR has put into the court's hand a small but powerful
weapon which can be triggered by nothing more than: "The
movant has not demonstrated prejudice. The motion is denied.
CPLR § 3026."
I have referred to a "movant," yet I have not specified
any motions. In fact, the illustration I have used implies a
motion to separately state and number. While the CPLR has a
specific requirement of separate numbering,2 6 nowhere does it
provide that a motion may be made to compel separate numbering.
May such a motion be made?
The CPLR also expressly requires that a pleading contain
"the material elements of each cause of action or defense." 2 7
Yet if such a material element is omitted from a pleading, there
is no CPLR provision allowing a motion to compel the pleader
to include it. Will such a motion lie? 28
Rules 3015 and 3016 contain diverse pleading requirements
applicable to particular causes of action. For example, it is
required that the complaint state whether plaintiff or defendant is
a corporation and, if known, the place of incorporation.29 If a
party is a corporation and the complaint omits to say so, will a
26 CPLR R. 3014.
27 CPLR § 3013.
28 If a material element is omitted from a cause of action or defense,
a motion to dismiss would lie under rule 3211(a) (7) or (b). Our
query at this juncture is: Will a corrective motion be available to compel
the inclusion of the supposedly material element that the movant claims is
omitted? The CPLR presents no difficulties when a cabse of action or
defense is not stated. Rule 3211 makes available the weapon of a motion
to dismiss. If the cause of action or defense is stated, however, is there
any other kind of motion to which § 3013 may give rise? It is the latter
kind of problem that this article is concerned with.29 CPLR R. 3015(b).
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motion lie to compel the allegation? There, too, no CPLR
provision in terms authorizes such a motion. Will it lie by
implication?
As to all of the above matters, it is not clear whether or
not a motion will lie. The revisers had corrective motions in
mind and, indeed, the CPLR has a provision covering the subject:
rule 3024, to which I will come shortly. But the grounds for
the motion are quite narrow and would not necessarily cover
corrective motions on the grounds stated above. There may be
cases where a motion on one or more of the above grounds is
appropriate. Probably, it is best to leave the door open to them
in a proper case. But one thing is certain: the only case that
can be "proper" is one in which the movant can show prejudice.
That requirement of Section 3026 of the CPLR pervades all
corrective motions.
I have dwelt on the possibility of implied corrective motions,
i.e., corrective motions that are not expressly provided for by
rule 3024, because I want to set forth what seems to me a simple
but ideal way to measure the validity of a pleading under the
CPLR, and perhaps the only way to effectuate the benevolent
aim of the revisers to do away with the plethora of corrective
motions that impeded pleading under the CPA. That way is
to measure the pleading by the motions that could be made against
it. If the pleader immunizes his pleading from all of the motions
that the CPLR makes available against a pleading, it is a good
pleading under the new practice and the attorneys had best turn
their attention to the merits of the case.
It would be helpful to set out the specifically available motions
first, though treatment of them is deferred until later. The
motions are: (1) the motion to dismiss a pleading for failure
to state a cause of action under rule 3211 (a) (7) ; (2) the motion
for a more definite statement under rule 3024(a); and (3) the
motion to strike unnecessarily scandalous or prejudicial matter
from a pleading under rule 3024(b). If the pleader so drafts
his pleading as to immunize it from the above three motions, his
pleading is, basically, a good one under the CPLR.
Keping Implied Motions to a Minimum
I used the word "basically" because I do not want to convey
the impression that the above three motions are the only ones
that lie against a pleading under the CPLR. They are the
only ones expressly provided for. But since there are a number
of pleading requirements, such as I have made brief reference
to above, 30 the door must be left open to possible implied motions
30 See, e.g., CPLR § 3013; RR. 3014-16.
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under such other requirements as may be applicable in a given
case. But these should not be frequent, and the courts should see
to it that they are kept infrequent by denying any kind of
corrective motion on which the movant cannot sustain a showing
of prejudice.
A further example may be helpful. Using once again the
requirement of separate numbering, suppose a plaintiff fails to
separately number his allegations and puts everything into one
or two paragraphs. Should his adversary be allowed a motion
to separately state and number? An automatic "yes" is not
consistent with the CPLR. If, though all in a single paragraph,
the allegations are readily susceptible of answer, no motion would
lie under section 3024(a) for a more definite statement. As to
whether an implied motion would lie under rule 3014, aimed
specifically at separate numbering rather than a more definite
statement, that second question would have to be asked, as
required by section 3026: is the movant prejudiced? If he is,
the motion should lie. If he is not, it should not. In the
example, it would seem that the movant is not at all prejudiced.
Though several allegations are in a single-numbered paragraph, we
have concluded that the movant is able to answer them. If he is,
how is he prejudiced by the failure to separately state and
number?
Now look at a pleading to which no response is required.
Look at an answer containing no counterclaims,31 but just denials
and a few affirmative defenses. As I will show more fully in
a moment, such a pleading is not subject to a section 3024(a)
motion for a more definite statement. Is it subject, then, to an
implied motion to separately state and number? Here, too, a
conclusion depends on the facts of the case. Is the answer so
poorly numbered, are its allegations so jumbled, that the plaintiff
does not have notice of the defendant's position? 32 If so, plaintiff
can show prejudice and avoid the bar of section 3026; the motion
should lie.33  If not, how is he prejudiced? And if he is not
prejudiced, can any such motion be allowed him without ignoring
the unambiguous instruction of section 3026 to ignore defects
"if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced?"
31 If an answer contains a counterclaim, the CPLR (like the CPA)
requires a reply to it. CPLR § 3011.
32The basic requirement of the CPLR, in § 3013, is that all pleadings
give notice of what the pleader relies on by way of cause of action or
defense.
33By analogy to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which a
similar problem arose, a motion to separately state and number could, if
necessary, be implied. See Porto Transp. v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp.,
19 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). But § 3026 of the CPLR would make
indispensable a showing of prejudice before the motion, even if implied,
could be entertained.
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And so it goes. Any and every activity relative to the correction
of pleadings under the CPLR should, before the court intercedes,
be shown to prejudice a substantial right of the moving party.
A leading text on the CPLR has cautioned bench and bar alike
to be wary of using the CPLR's pleading provisions as founda-
tions on which to build a motion practice:
A motion under any of the pleading provisions in Article 30 that is
corrective in nature and is not specifically authorized in CPLR 3024 should
be permitted only if the alleged defect prejudices a substantial right of a
party.
34
The quotation should be faithfully heeded by the courts; it
is the statement of those who were among the chief draftsmen
of the CPLR. Their admonition gets even more specific. They
point out that: "Motion practice can, if not restrained by the
courts, develop under many of the provisions of Article 30. Prime
spawning grounds include this provision [CPLR Rule 3024],
CPLR 3015, and CPLR 3016." 35
Since rule 3024 is the express corrective motion provision
of the CPLR, the above is a reminder that section 3026, requiring
defects to be ignored where no substantial right is prejudiced,
is applicable not only to corrective motions that can be spelled
out by implication at best, but also to the express corrective
motions allowed by rule 3024.
If an extended motion practice develops in spite of all this,
the cause will probably be traceable to the failure to start the
CPLR off on the right foot. Now the CPLR is in its infancy.
The habits it develops now will determine how well it behaves
after puberty. If I may paraphrase an old adage about dogs and
old age: it is hard to teach an old practice act a new approach.
Right now the CPLR is very young. If it is to accomplish in
the realm of pleadings what its draftsmen planned for it, it cannot
wait very long. The courts should not be at all disposed to
resist it. It should be a boon to a judge at special term. As
soon as a corrective motion appears, his two questions should be:
what do you want the pleader to do and how have you been
prejudiced by his failure to do it? If the movant is articulate
and clear in what he wants of the pleader, and even correct in
his idea about the pleader's obligation, the judge should still deny
the motion if not satisfied that the movant has been prejudiced
by the pleader's error. If lack of prejudice plainly appears at
the hearing on the return day of the motion, the motion should
34 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE fr 3024.01,
at 30-396 (1963).35 Id. at n. 3.
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be denied then and there. A bonus to the judge will be that
he has one less motion to take home.
The Three Constituent Motions of the "Motion Yardstick"
There is yet another compelling reason to resist finding motions
by implication. Section 5701(b) and (c) of the CPLR has made
orders on the express corrective motions-those provided in rule
3024-appealable only by permission, rather than as of right. It
is another way that the legislature has chosen to publish its
intention to diminish the place of corrective motions in New
York practice. If corrective motions should be implied from
other provisions of article 30, orders issuing on them would not
fall under section 5701(b) and (c), and hence would not require
leave to appeal. They would more likely end up under section
5701 (a) (2) (iv) or (v), and therefore be appealable as of right.
Such result would impute to the legislature an intention to give
to motions it omits from the CPLR. a greater dignity than it gives
to motions it has expressly included. The court should have this
in mind when it is asked to find corrective motions by implication.
The three basic motions that can be made against a
pleading-those that are specifically provided for-should be the
subject of somewhat more extensive investigation. These motions
are, as indicated, (1) the motion to dismiss under rule 3211 (a) (7) ;
(2) the motion for a more definite statement under rule 3024(a) ;
and (3) the motion to strike unnecessary scandalous and prejudicial
matter under rule 3024(b). It will be noticed that (1) is a
dispositive motion; if the motion is granted the pleading is dis-
missed. The remaining two are corrective motions; their granting
brings about not a dismissal, but an amendment.
Yardstick One: Does the Pleading State a Cause of Action?
The first requirement of any affirmative pleading is that it
state a cause of action. To set forth what a cause of action is,
by way of example, would require as many examples as there are
causes of action. What a cause of action consists of is not a
question of procedure, but of substantive law. Under the CPLR,
if a cause of action can be spelled out from the four corners of
the pleading, a cause of action is stated and no motion lies under
rule 3211(a) (7).
The pleading can be pathetically drawn; it can reek of
miserable draftsmanship. That is not the inquiry on a motion
under rule 3211 (a) (7). We want only to know whether it states
a cause of action. If it does, a rule 3211(a) (7) motion does
not lie and the pleading is immune from it. The pleading can
consist of one twenty-five page paragraph with a thousand
allegations. It can have not a single number appearing
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anywhere in it, much less be separately numbered according to
rule 3014. These factors, too, are irrelevant on a rule 3211 (a) (7)
inquiry, which cares not at all about whether the pleading is
numbered properly or not. To use just a brief illustration, take
a fraud cause of action. The "material elements" (required by
section 3013) of the cause of action are, in general, these:
(1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) reliance thereon,
(4) scienter, and (5) damages.
If the twenty-five page monstrosity that we are using as an
example sought to plead a fraud cause of action, and the above
five elements could be found buried in it on, respectively, pages
7, 9, 14, 19 and 22, that pleading would state the cause of action
and should not be dismissed under rule 3211 (a) (7).
The foregoing is not to indicate that the CPLR invites that
kind of pleading. Surely there is a remedy available to the one
pleaded against: he can move for a more definite statement under
rule 3024(a). But that is a matter distinct from whether the
pleading states a cause of action, and that is the sole inquiry
upon a motion under rule 3211 (a) (7).
The federal rules do not use "cause of action," as section
3013 and rule 3211 (a) (7) use it. The federal rules use the
phrase "claim for relief." 36 It has been suggested that: "there
is little evidence that the federal 'claim for relief' formulation
achieves any different results from the New York 'cause of action'
standard." 37
And the Moore text on the federal rules states this:
While the Rules have substituted "claim" or "claim for relief" in lieu of
the older and troublesome term "cause of action," the pleading must still
state a "cause of action" in the sense that it must show "that the pleader
is entitled to relief." 38
The federal cases support that view.39
It is thus suggested that the federal criteria for judging
pleadings is importable into New York practice under the CPLR.
Whether the New York courts will turn to the federal cases for
ideas about how liberally they may now regard pleadings is not
a certainty. The mere use of the words "cause of action" in
section 3013 and rules 3211 (a) (7) and 3014 could be cited
in support of the view that our pleadings are not to be as liberally
regarded as in the federal courts, if the New York courts are
36 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (a).
3"3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, op. cit. supra note 34, 13013.06, at
30-153, n. 40.
382 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.13, at 1704-05 (2d ed. 1953).
39See, e.g., William Whitman Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 125 F.
Supp. 137 (D.C. Del. 1954), cited in 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra, note 38, at n. 23.
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disposed to hold back. But there is little to be said for such
a disposition. Little, perhaps, but something. Few lawyers would
say that it is wise to encourage the kind of pleading that the
Second Circuit sustained in Dioguardi v. Durning.40 There the
pleading had been drawn by plaintiff pro se. The plaintiff was
not merely unversed in the lawyer's skill of draftsmanship; he was
not at all at home with the English tongue. Nonetheless, an
indulgent Second Circuit searched through his delirious complaint
and found not one, but two, "claims." While I believe our courts
have ample room under the CPLR to reject such a pleading as
failing to state a cause of action, under rule 3211(a) (7), I believe
there is equal leeway to sustain it. A truly liberal treatment
of article 30-and the injunctions abound, that pleadings are to be
liberally construed 41-- could result in acceptance of a Dioguardi
complaint.
My own hope is that our courts will go that far.42  It would
clearly set the range of the CPLR's approach to pleadings; and
it would have the direct effect of casting out all the old nonsense
that had CPA pleadings closer in tenor to early England than
to modern America. We shall see.
Two final notes on that point, and I will proceed to the
corrective motions. First, the primary aim of a CPLR pleading-
taking the instruction directly from section 3013-is to give "notice
of the transactions . . . intended to be proved and the material
elements of each cause of action or defense." Could the Second
Circuit have sustained Dioguardi's pleading if it failed to give
what the CPLR calls "notice of the transactions," or if it did
not contain the "material elements" that the CPLR requires? To
my mind, the answer is no. Phrasing the answer in the affirmative,
the conclusion would be that the Dioguardi court did find in his
pleading such "notice" and "material elements." If so, then
section 3013-the primary statute in point-itself opens the road
to the federal practice. Second, the bar is surely aware of the
40 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
4' Section 104 of the CPLR has a general provision dictating liberal
construction of the CPLR. If that does not suffice, § 3026 of the CPLR
may be cited; it contains a specific provision ordering that pleadings "be
liberally construed." The latter is the provision which declares that "defects
shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced."
42 It should also be remembered that, in spite of the recommendations of
the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, the bill of particulars
has been retained in New York. See CPLR § 3041. In that regard, the
tools available to one pleaded against to obtain details of the cause of action
asserted against him are broader than those of federal practice; federal
practice lacks a bill of particulars, though disclosure has a wider range in
the federal courts than in New York courts under the CPLR. That factor
should enable the courts to prevent the use of pleadings to obtain that
which can be had via the bill of particulars.
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practice in the state's lower courts that permits pleading by mere
indorsement. That method of pleading, as all lawyers who practice
in those courts are aware, permits a terse and summary statement
of the cause of action to be "indorsed" on the face of the summons.
It requires no formal or "long-form" pleading such as is used
in the Supreme Court. Is it not amazing that the courts which
permit indorsement pleading have survived for so long, and
continue to get on quite well? When the New York City and
Municipal Courts were merged into the New York City Civil
Court in 1962, the Albert Committee 4 had to determine whether
to continue the Municipal Court's practice of indorsement pleading
or adopt the usual "long-form" pleading used in the Stpreme
Court. After much investigation, it was decided to retain the
indorsement pleading, at least in a majority of the Civil Court's
cases. When the New York City Civil Court Act was recast
(and the Uniform District Court Act first drafted) in 1963, the
indorsement pleading was continued in section 902 of the respective
acts. The theory behind its continuance is that-very simply-
it works. If so, why should it be dispensed with in favor of
the Supreme Court's "long-form" pleading? In fact, has anyone ever
seriously considered making the indorsement pleading available
in the Supreme Court? The question is a legitimate one for
discussion. And in any event, both bench and bar should call to
mind the success of the indorsement pleading in the state's lower
courts before developing any dire notions of what might happen
to Supreme Court pleadings if the CPLR is liberally construed.
The recollection will make it easier to abandon prior law notions
of pleading.
Yardstick Two: Is the Pleading Reasonably Susceptible of Answer?
One of the two corrective motions specifically offered by the
CPLR is the motion for a more definite statement in rule 3024(a).
It applies where the pleading "is so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a response .... "
It is thus available only to a party who is required to respond
to the pleading. It is available to a defendant required 44 to answer
a complaint. It is available to a plaintiff who is required to reply
to a counterclaim. It is also available to one against whom a
cross-claim, third-party claim or interpleader claim is asserted,
because each of them is required to answer such a claim.45 If
an answer contains no counterclaim, it cannot be voluntarily replied
43 The Committee's formal name is the Joint Legislative Committee on
Court Reorganization.
44 CPLR § 3011.
45 Ibid.
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to by the plaintiff; hence the plaintiff cannot move under rule
3024(a) to have such an answer made more definite. But in
such instance the court may order the plaintiff to reply to the
answer, and in such event the rule 3024(a) motion would become
available to the plaintiff.
The motion is simple enough to understand on its own
terms. The vagueness or ambiguity must be such as to make
it unreasonable to compel a response to it. If it be somewhat
vague or ambiguous, but .still may reasonably be answered, the
motion is unavailable. The prejudice to a responding party, which
rule 3024(a) seeks to guard against, is stated right in the rule.
It is probably true, therefore, that such a motion would not
require the application of section 3026, which requires the court
to ignore 'defects that are not prejudicial. Rule 3024(a) is
available, because of its own terms, only upon a showing of
prejudice, which reduces the importance of section 3026 in this
instance.
Hence we have another motion which the draftsman of a
pleading should guard against. This motion looks only to an
amendment of the challenged pleading, not a dismissal of it.46
With the dispositive motion of rule 3211(a) (7), the rule 3024(a)
corrective motion is the second one that the draftsman should 'be
aware of.
Yardstick Three: Does the Pleading Contain Any Unnecessary
Scandalous or Prejudicial Matter?
The second, and last, specific corrective motion provided by
the CPLR is that of rule 3024(b): the motion "to strike any
scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in a pleading."
Note and underscore the word "unnecessarily."
If a plaintiff is suing her husband for divorce in New York,
the allegation of adultery is a necessary part of her case. Adultery
is scandalous, and the fact of it will not enhance the defendant's
standing in the community. Hence the allegation is both scandalous
and prejudicial, but in that case it is not "unnecessarily" so.
Hence, the allegation belongs and the motion is obviously unavail-
able. In the context of an action on a promissory note, the same
allegation becomes unnecessary, and the motion may be made to
strike it out.
With that somewhat exaggerated example, the simple spirit
of rule 3024(b) can be captured. The motion, like the motion
for a more definite statement under rule 3204(a), does not (if
granted) result in a dismissal, but merely in an amendment.4 7
46See CPLR . 3024(c).
47 Ibid.
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It constitutes the third specific motion that the CPLR makes
available against a pleading.
Summation on the "Motion Yardstick:" Some Qualifications
The trio that makes up the "motion yardstick," to sum up,
are: (1) the motion to dismiss under rule 3211(a) (7) ; (2)
the motion for a more definite statement under rule 3024(a);
and (3) the motion to strike scandalous or prejudicial matter
unnecessarily inserted und&r rule 3024(b).
If the draftsman of the pleading proceeds with those three
motions in mind, and successfully immunizes the pleading from the
three of them, he has come up with a good pleading under the
CPLR. To that general proposition, I must now add two
conditions.
First, a reminder that the CPLR has a number of specific
requirements, some of which are applicable generally 48 and some
of which apply only in particular cases.4 9  Article 30 has a
number of such requirements. As was indicated previously
in this article, such specific requirements can give rise to implied
motions to carry them out. However that may be, they should
in no instance be permitted unless the movant demonstrates
prejudice under section 3026. The pleader should be aware of
these provisions, however, regardless of the fact that the CPLR
does not expressly provide for corrective motions to implement
them.
Second, it should be borne in mind that we are here con-
sidering the pleading only as a pleading. The possible motions
that we are using as yardsticks to measure the validity of the
pleading relate only to its form, and not to its merits. Numerous
motions may be made against the pleading on its merits, or on
other grounds that defeat the cause of action, e.g., statute of
limitations, statute of frauds, release, and res judicata.50 These are
not relevant here.
Prior-Law Motions Addressed to Pleadings Abolished by the CPLR
With the "motion yardstick" in hand now, we can readily
perceive some of the more obvious improvements in pleading
under the CPLR. What has happened to the hypertechnical
phenomena that so occupied judicial effort under prior law? What
has happened to the word "facts," such as had to be pleaded
48 See, e.g., CPLR §3017; R. 3014.
49 See, e.g., CPLR RR. 3015-16.50 See CPLR R. 3211(a), which lists the various grounds. Note that
only one of the grounds listed-that in paragraph 7-relates to the pleading
as a pleading.
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under Section 241 of the CPA? What has happened to the
"evidence" that the same provision banned from pleadings under
prior practice? And where is an instruction to plead "ultimate"
facts, as was deemed requisite to carry out the old law edict against
"evidentiary" facts? Is a "conclusion of law" still anathema
to a pleading? And what of the sham ground, and the frivolous
ground, and the redundant, repetitious, unnecessary and impertinent
ground under old rule 103, any of which could bog down
a motion part under prior law? The fact is they are all
gone.
Section 3013 and Rule 3014 of the CPLR speak of "state-
ments" and "elements" and "allegations" and "matters," but they
omit completely any reference to "facts." The fetish over how
"facts" should be pleaded has been removed by the most obvious
means available: the omission of the word "facts" in the directions
about how to plead.51
Suppose a pleading contains "evidentiary facts" under the
CPLR? It can do so with impunity, as long as the pleading
states a cause of' action, is reasonably susceptible of answer, and
contains no unnecessary scandalous or prejudicial matter. The
pleader's adversary has gotten more than he is entitled to when
the pleader has set forth some of what he deems his evidence.
On the other hand, if there is so much evidentiary matter in the
pleading that it would be unreasonable to require an answer to it,
the adversary can move against it. But the motion will not be
one to strike evidentiary matter; it will be a motion for a more
definite statement under rule 3024(a).
Suppose a pleading is not phrased in "ultimate" facts? Sup-
pose it does what the CPA regarded as an outrage: it alleges
something that might actually qualify as a "conclusion of law?"
A CPLR pleading can do that with impunity too, so long as the
pleading states a cause of action, is reasonably susceptible of
answer, and contains no unnecessary scandalous or prejudicial
matter. (If those words begin to sound familiar and this article
begins to sound a little repetitious, it will have made its point!)
The CPLR has cast aside the absurd battle 5 2 that has raged
51The Moore text on the federal rules treats at length the subject:
"Why the Pleading of 'Facts' Is Not Required." See 2 MooRm, op. cit. supra
note 38, ff 8.12, at 1683. The approach is predicated on the absence of the
word "facts" in the governing federal rules. Since New York's governing
provisions under the CPLR also omit the word "facts," the road to the
federal rules has been cleared of one of its most significant obstacles.52For examples of the objectionable use of a "conclusion of law" in
prior-law negligence pleadings, see Pagnillo v. Mack Paving & Constr. Co.,
142 App. Div. 491, 127 N.Y.Supp. 72 (2d Dep't 1911), decided during the
reign of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Newell v. Woodward, 241 App.
Div. 786, 270 N.Y.Supp. 258 (3d Dep't 1934), decided under the CPA.
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between "ultimate facts" and "conclusions of law." Often that
which constituted one would also qualify as the other, and
Blackstone himself could not define the difference. If a pleading
contains one or even several conclusions of law, no motion lies
against it on that ground. If all it states is conclusory matter,
it may not be susceptible of answer, which would permit a rule
3024(a) motion. Or, in the case of a pleading not required
to be answered, it may be so devoid of information as to fail
to give the "notice" required by section 3013. That might give
rise to an implied motion pursuant to section 3013, and a
showing of prejudice in such event could be made under section
3026 to satisfy that condition as well. But those are grounds
entirely distinct from the mere ground that the pleading contains a
"conclusion of law." That "ground" is no ground for a CPLR
motion.
If a pleading is sham or frivolous, it should be attacked for
failing to state a cause of action under rule 3211 (a) (7). The
movant will not be limited to what appears on'. the face of the
pleading. Rule 3211(c) permits affidavits and other evidence
to be submitted on a motion to dismiss under rule 3211 (a) (7),
so the movant will not be precluded from showing, by evidence, that
the pleading is sham or frivolous and should therefore be dismissed
because there is no cause of action. But the ground is not the
sham as such, or the frivolity as such, but the broader ground
that the pleading can be shown to state no cause of action. This
is a phenomenon that New York practitioners will have to become
accustomed to. It will be very difficult for one versed in the old
practice to appreciate the possibilities open under the revisers'
approach in rule 3211. If a pleading "fails to state a cause of
action," as rule 3211(a) (7) phrases its ground, the practitioner
would too quickly conclude that its failure must be apparent on
its face. That is not true. The movant may go behind the
pleading now, and by affidavits show that, though the complaint
is handsomely drawn and purports plainly to state a good cause
of action, there is in fact no cause of action because the pleading
is a sham, or frivolous. So, no motion lies under the CPLR
to strike a pleading, or matter contained in a pleading, because
it is sham or frivolous. If the sham or frivolity has gone far
enough to effect the entire cause of action, a rule 3211(a)(7)
motion to dismiss is in order. If it falls short of that, the
adversary can merely deny the supposedly sham or frivolous
part.
If a pleading contains redundant or repetitious matter, the
party pleaded against should deem himself doubly informed. If
the pleading states a cause of action, is reasonably susceptible
of answer, and contains no unnecessary scandalous or prejudicial
matter, it is a good pleading and the redundancy or repetitiveness
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means nothing. If it is so redundant and repetitive as to make
it unsusceptible of an answer, a 3024(a) motion lies, but, barring
that, redundancy and repetitiveness, however, out of place in a
pleading, is not punishable under the CPLR by any motion at all.
If the redundancy and repetition do not make the pleading un-
answerable, the party pleaded against is not prejudiced; hence,
section 3026 would preclude even an implied motion under rule
3014 which obviates repetition by providing that "prior statements
in a pleading shall be deemed repeated . . . whenever express
repetition . . . is unnecessary. . . 3
If matter in a pleading is irrelevant or unnecessary or im-
pertinent, the pleading is still a good one if-to repeat-it states
a cause of action, is reasonably susceptible of answer, and contains
no unnecessarily scandalous or prejudicial matter. If the matter
is unnecessary or irrelevant, it ought not to reflect on the outcome
of the case and might be ignored. If truly irrelevant, it might
even be admitted. If irrelevant and untrue, it can be denied.
If the irrelevancies are such as to make the pleading impractical
of answer, a rule 3024(a) motion lies. If the irrelevancies do not
reach that point, they do not prejudice the party pleaded against.
If matter is impertinent, whether that word be taken to mean
irrelevant or insolent, it is harmless, so long as the pleading states
a cause of action, etc. If the word means insolent or flippant,
it may well constitute "scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily
inserted," in which event a rule 3024(b) motion would lie. If the
matter abounds in insolence and flippancy, but is relevant to the
cause of action and proof of same could be received in evidence
at the trial, it belongs in the pleading or, in any event, cannot
be stricken from it under the CPLR.
What I have been doing in the foregoing discussion is pointing
up how best to think of pleadings under the CPLR. In each
instance of tracing what has happened to the myriad technicalities
of prior law, I have been applying the "motion yardsticks" that
the CPLR provides in rules 3024 and 3211 (a) (7). I have warned
of other motions that might arise by implication in a given in-
stance but, for a perspective of pleadings, the three expressly
provided motions offer, as I see it, the best insight into the
53 In Brander v. Bierman, (Sup. Ct., Kings County Nov. 13, 1963), 150
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1963, p. 17, col. 4 (Wecht, J.), the court ably demon-
strates that the CPLR no longer affords a motion to strike matter from a
pleading as sham or frivolous. The court then proceeds to analyze seven
defenses in the answer, dismissing the fifth, sixth and seventh defenses as
"repetitious of the first two defenses." Where is there authority in the
CPLR to strike defenses as. "repetitious," especially when there is no
showing of prejudice to the movant? There was no finding of prejudice
in the cited case, and there is no authority under the CPLR to strike
defenses as repetitious.
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CPLR's approach and the best precaution against a reversion to
the pleadings system of prior law.
These "motion yardsticks" work not merely to manifest the
disappearance of prior law motion grounds against pleadings; they
provide perhaps the most direct insight into the intent of the
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure in drawing the new
pleadings article.
A Look at Some Federal Forms
If the courts forbid nice distinctions between New York's
"cause of action" and the federal "claim for relief," they will
have cleared the road to the federal rules of all debris. Having
done so, they will find a set of forms which is official in the
federal courts and which can supply incisive guides for what
can now satisfy in our state courts. For example, the second
paragraph of form 6 of the official federal forms is the "Complaint
for Money Lent." It is so pithy as to cause a New York lawyer
to blink. It goes thus: "Defendant owes plaintiff . . . dollars
for money lent by plaintiff to defendant on June 1, 1936."
What under the CPLR does it lack? It states a cause of
action, precluding a dismissal motion under Rule 3211(a)(7) of
the CPLR. It gives the defendant notice of the transaction
relied upon by plaintiff, satisfying that primary requirement of
Section 3013 of the CPLR. It also has the "material elements"
of the cause of action, the other requirement of section 3013.
It is on that last point, however, that a la-vyer bent on
reversion to prior law will build his case. His protest will actually
be that the pleading does not set forth enough to constitute what
he was used to in pleadings under prior law. But he will have
to justify his position under the CPLR. Lacking any provision
about "facts," he will probably come to rest on the "material
elements" requirements of section 3013, and use that to ground
his argument. This pleading, he will urge, does not contain the
necessary "material elements." But just what element does it
lack? If anything additional were set forth in the above pleading,
the added matter would be nothing more than an amplification of
it. Amplification is the function of a bill of particulars. But it
will not take too much effort to confuse a pleading with a bill
of particulars: prior-law notions would make that easy, and prior-
law notions are not readily legislated away. It will take more
effort to separate the two. But that will be the effort that brings
rewards.
The pleading exemplified above is a simple commercial cause
of action. Lest the reader believe that the new pleadings provisions
would not work on more complicated matters, let it be noted that
the federal rules do not beg the question. Official form 9 of the
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federal rules, for example, is the "Complaint for Negligence."
In its second and third paragraphs, totalling just nine lines between
them, a cause of action is set forth in a "pedestrian knockdown"
case. There is even included, within the nine lines, an allegation
of special damages and the sum incurred for them. To complete
the scoff at New York's old pleading notions, the word "negligently"
appears. There is everything to make a CPA-indoctrinated lawyer
gasp; but there is everything to satisfy as a pleading under the
CPLR. A cause of action is stated, which precludes a rule
3211 (a) (7) motion; notice is given and the material elements are
present, so section 3013 is satisfied; there is separate numbering,
fulfilling rule 3014; the pleading is answerable, making the rule
3024(a) motion unavailable; and nothing prejudicial or scandalous
is included which completes the picture by casting out a rule
3024(b) motion. The pleading has everything the CPLR wants. 4
If pain persists get a bill of particulars.
54 The CPLR now has the additional requirement that "special damages
shall be itemized." CPLR R. 3015 (d). This may tend to complicate plead-
ing in actions, like negligence, where special damages are important. It
should be noted that the requirement was imposed early in the drafting stage
of the CPLR. 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 6(b), FiRsr PREL INARY REPORT
OF THE ADvisORY COmMIirEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 65. It was
drafted when the Advisory Committee had mind to abolish the bill of
particulars. The bill of particulars was later reinstated. 1961 N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 15, FIFTH PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVIsORY CoMMITTEE ON
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 437. See the explanatory note, Id. at 440. The
Advisory Committee would probably have reconsidered the requirement that
a pleading itemize special damages, if a bill of particulars were to be
available to do that job, but the bill of particulars was reinserted after
the Advisory Committee had concluded its labors. It is interesting in this
regard to note that there are two fifth reports, one by the Advisory Com-
mittee and one jointly by the Senate Finance Committee and the Assembly
Ways and Means Committee. The former is entitled the "Final Report"
of the Advisory Committee; the latter is the "Fifth Preliminary Report"
of the legislative committees. They are in marked contrast on the subject
of the bill of particulars.
The Advisory Committee report contains a rule 3064 as its last provi-
sion in the pleadings article. The Legislative Committee's report has an
additional rule: rule 3070. That rule 3070 is the original reappearance of
the bill of particulars provision.
This background should be remembered. The reinstatement of the bill
of particulars makes much less important the CPLR requirement of rule
3015(d) that special damages be itemized. If a pleading be attacked for
failure to "itemize" special damages according to the provision, the court
should inquire whether a bill of particulars can supply what is needed. If
it can, the court should be hesitant to require that the pleading go any
further on the subject than it already has; the bill of particulars will do
the rest.
A different conclusion might be warranted in instances, such as in
certain defamation cases, where special damages are an integral part of
the cause of action itself. However that might be, the itemization of
damages should not be used promiscuously to ground corrective motions in
cases where special damages are not an element of the cause of action, and
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If the bar appreciates and supports what the CPLR has
tried to do in pleadings, the courts will soon shape article 30
into a living instrumentality that can remove the drudgery from
pleading and permit more productive use of both the lawyers' and
the judges' time.
If, several years from now, the case law on article 30 does
not show the changes that were so enthusiastically contemplated
by the revisers, the faulto 'ili" not lie with the CPLR. It has pro-
vided all of the necessary tools. The question is only: how will
they be used? A practice act is only words; it is for the courts
to give them meaning and it is for the bar to advise the courts.
where a bill of particulars can supply the necessary detail. On the general
subject of pleading special damages, see 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER,
NEw YoRx CivIL PRACTICE 30-204-09 (1963).
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